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I. INTRODUCTION
The right policy response to boom-bust credit cycles in emerging markets remains controversial. In a review of how emerging markets coped with the recent global financial crisis, IMF (2010) found that countries that managed to keep external pre-crisis vulnerabilities relatively low tended to recover faster from the crisis. In particular, prudential and capital control policies are the conventional tools to counter boom-bust cycles, but their design, effectiveness, and effects remain subjects of debate (see for instance, Ostry et al., 2010, and Stiglitz, 2003) . Once a bust takes place, Calvo (2010) has argued that there is a strong case to attenuate credit conditions, particularly for small-and medium-sized enterprises, and he conjectured that credit subsidies could provide a potentially effective tool.
This paper provides evidence on the effectiveness of countercyclical credit subsidies, drawing on a rare policy experiment in Serbia. Credit subsidies have been standard policy fare for addressing market imperfections in advanced countries, notwithstanding questions about adverse allocation and other effects (see Buttari, 1995; Rapisarda and Patacchini, 2003) . On aggregate level, excessive optimism followed by sudden corrections, which produce boombust cycles, can be also viewed as consequence of market imperfections. Therefore credit subsidies could be a potentially effective tool to address these imperfections during a bust, see Calvo (2010) . However, there seems to be no direct evidence available on the effectiveness of such credit subsidies. Largely due to unusual local circumstances, the Serbian government had at the beginning of 2009 the scope to launch a package of credit subsidies to counteract the spillovers from the global financial crisis. Serbia's experience with these credit subsidies is explored in this paper, and can offer some preliminary evidence on Calvo's policy conjecture.
The paper uses a simple, calibrated model with a financial accelerator to gauge the effects of credit subsidies. The model focuses on the non-financial sector. An adverse shock (demand, interest rate, exchange rate depreciation on unhedged FX credit, or credit standards) impacts companies' cash flows and weakens their credit worthiness for credit renewal. The exit of companies that do not get renewed credit aggravates the initial adverse shock and deepens the economic downturn (see Bernanke et al. 1996) . In this setting, credit subsidies improve cash flow either directly (enterprise credit subsidies via reducing interest payments) or indirectly (consumer credit subsidies via increasing in demand for companies' products). Thus, credit subsidies can mitigate a severe economic downturn.
The paper concludes that Serbia's credit subsidy scheme apparently helped to buffer the economy against deeper recession during a bust but it is too early to assess whether it was socially optimal. The model-based estimates suggest that without credit subsidies the economy could have experienced a deeper recession (by about 1-2 percentage points of GDP growth). This may help to explain why Serbia experienced a relatively mild output recession in 2009, taking into account that Serbia was one of the most vulnerable and exposed countries in the region.
scope of this paper as it involves longer-term intertemporal consideration of growth and redistribution effects.
The specific circumstances surrounding Serbia's credit subsidy experiment also suggest that it may be difficult to replicate. First, at the beginning of 2009, the Serbian government had unexpectedly fiscal resources available for this purpose (reallocated from other already budgeted spending that was unlikely to be spent given the crisis). Second, an energetic Ministry of Economy moved quickly to put the scheme in place. Third, account blockages of delinquent debtors-a Serbian specific feature-posed an important threat to corporate system liquidity, potentially causing widespread insolvency. Fourth, a key incentive to make the scheme work was provided by the central bank, which allowed deducting subsidized credit from the reserve requirement base. Fifth, prudent supervisory policies, prior the crisis, made banks particularly well liquid and solvent. And sixth, the success in promoting subsidized lending was in part facilitated by strong competition in the banking sector (with the Hirsch-Herfindahl index of 626, the Serbian banking sector is the least concentrated banking sector in Europe). For the sake of keeping their clients, banks were inclined to grant subsidized loans, even though the return from such loans was minimal or negative.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces the main vehicle for simulating effects of credit subsidies in the non-financial sector, while the third section describes an approximation used for the rest of the economy. Section four is devoted to the Serbian case, including the model calibration and policy simulations. Section five concludes.
II. THE MODEL OF A NON-FINANCIAL SECTOR
This section introduces a partial equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with Dixit-Stiglitz technology. The model describes the behavior of small, medium, and large companies in a non-financial sector. There is a finite number of companies holding own capital, which is distributed normally. Companies need working capital to produce and banks provide credit only to companies with a certain minimum level of own capital; therefore not all companies produce in all times. Individual companies are price takers in the sector's labor market. The non-financial sector's budget constraint is partially exogenous, since it depends on government's and households' decisions, which are not modeled endogenously.
A. Households
Homogenous households work and consume. A finite number of households 3 supply homogenous labor to the sector and receive an equal wage. The wage is determined by the sector's aggregate labor demand and supply. The aggregate labor supply is elastic (parameter ρ) in the number of employees. In consumption of goods, households like variety -they prefer a mix of products to an equal amount of a single good q i . Therefore, their utility can be represented by a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function and the aggregate sector's utility-demand Q is defined as follows:
where ɵ is the elasticity of substitution; and there are n goods. Since each company produces one close substitute good q i , there are n companies.
Households maximize utility (1) respecting the budget constraint. Households' utility increases with the amount of goods q i ; however, purchases of goods are constrained by household's budgets. The budget (PQ) for sector's output is a share (κ) of the aggregate budget in the economy (AD), which is the sum of all wages, profits of companies and banks, changes in savings, and government expenditures (including subsidies). Since the rest of the economy is not modeled here, the size of the sector's budget is semi-exogenous to the model.
The utility-consistent price index assures model consistency. The theoretically-consistent price index assures that the product of aggregate utility-based quantity and the aggregate price index will be consistent with the aggregate budget constraint. Thus, the aggregate price index P reads:
where p i is the price of the good q i .
Households' preferences determine the sector's market structure. From the utility maximization with respect to the budget constraint, it follows that there is a residual demand for each product q i -a characteristic of imperfectly competitive markets. Using the aggregate values as numeraire, the residual demand functions are defined as follows:
B. Companies
Companies differ in the amount of own capital. They hire labor l i and produce close substitute products q i according to a linear production function q i =A l i . The parameter A is the labor productivity factor. Companies need working capital to produce. They have own capital (k i ) in local currency, which covers a portion of the needed working capital and the rest they need to borrow from banks in domestic or foreign currency (FX).
They are homogenous in the optimal choice of output but their free cash flows differ. Companies maximize profit by choosing an optimal q i , with respect to the residual demand function (3), the production function, and other exogenously given variables and parameters. In particular, they solve the following program:
where i is the interest rate on bank loans, α is the unhedged share of bank loans, and Δs is a percentage change in the nominal exchange rate. The first derivative of the expression (4) defines the price of good q i :
The optimal quantity q i is related to the rearranged expression for residual demand (3), (-ɵ) Q , but it remains undetermined due to unknown number of companies n, which is needed to evaluate the aggregate price index P = n
Once n is determined, we can compute Q from the semi-exogenous aggregate budget constraint and evaluate q i . The optimal choice of output and prices are common to all companies (also because the share of unhedged loans is assumed equal across companies), but since some need to borrow more working capital from banks than others, free cash flows differ across companies.
C. Banks
Banks determine the number of companies on the margin. Given the distribution of own capital and banks' lending standards for free cash flows, banks determine the number of companies that receive credit. Companies that need to borrow a larger amount of working capital will have a lower free cash flow. There is a threshold for the free cash flow that banks require for lending. Companies that do not satisfy this threshold do not receive credit (i.e., the extensive margin; there is no intensive margin in the model). During distress, highly leveraged companies will be the first to not get renewed credit and close down.
The distribution of free cash flows is primarily determined by the distribution of own capital-k i ~ G(μ, σ). There are two other variables that affect the distribution of free cash flows: (1) exchange rate changes; and (2) interest rate changes. The free cash flow π of a company i is given by the following relation: 
D. Equilibrium
The equilibrium is derived by iterating over sector's wage, number of companies, and demand. Given the wage, aggregate budget constraint, number of companies with positive own capital, profit threshold for receiving credit, mean and standard deviation of own capital, share of unhedged FX credit, interest rate, exchange rate change, labor productivity factor, elasticity of labor supply, and the elasticity of substitution, endogenous variables are determined according to the following relations by iterating over the wage, number of companies, and the sector's demand as follows:
Evaluate:
Letters AD stand for the aggregate demand of the economy in the previous equilibrium.
Verify 
E. The Role of the Exchange Rate
The exchange rate plays an important role in business cycle amplitudes of emerging markets. Emerging markets need foreign borrowing since domestic capital is scarce. Growth prospects attract foreign capital inflows (both direct and short-term investment), which balance the trade balance deficit, such that the exchange rate remains rather stable. Companies often borrow in FX-motivated by lower interest rate on FX loans-and carry significant open positions in foreign currency.

If capital inflows are excessive, the exchange rate appreciates and boosts the real economic activity. In particular, the exchange rate appreciation lowers prices 5 -via (equations 7 and 10), increasing quantities produced and employment (equations 8, 9, and 12), increasing profits (10), wages (13) , and the number of producing companies (11).
Reversely, during a crisis, the capital outflow weakens the exchange rate (and increases both the debt service of unhedged FX borrowings) and forces companies to increase prices, banks close less profitable companies, and the real economic activity falls.
Therefore, the exchange rate fluctuations during optimistic and pessimistic outlooks aggravate business cycle amplitudes.
F. The Effects of Credit Subsidies
Interest rate credit subsidies lower borrowing costs for companies and stimulate consumers demand. During a crisis, free cash flows of companies suffer from exchange rate depreciation on unhedged FX borrowings and weakening demand. The interest rate subsidy lowers borrowing costs for companies, thereby increases free cash flows and eases the access to credit renewal.
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Consumer credit subsidies increase demand, which also increases companies' cash flows.
The effectiveness of credit interest rate subsidies for companies varies with the size of the exchange rate shock. The distribution of free cash flows changes with exchange rate and interest rate changes (equation 6). Exchange rate depreciation affects free cash flows and several companies fall below the profitability threshold, which is required by banks for a credit renewal. Since the distribution of free cash flows is not uniform but bell-shaped and often rather narrow, 7 the marginal exchange rate depreciation has increasing marginal effect on the number 5 Such situation can appear also under fixed exchange rate regime, particularly if there is market perception of negligible exchange rate risk during a boom. 6 The adverse selection problem in granting credit is less of an issue since credit subsidies do not change credit risk but improve cash flows.
7 Margins tend to cluster around a market average. For instance, in the Czech Republic in 1993-2003, exporting companies charged price-cost margin 15 percent on average with a standard deviation of 4 percent (based on data (continued…) of companies close-down due to credit disapprovals by banks. In practical terms, a percentage point interest rate credit subsidy (measured on the stock of loans) will have a small effect if introduced when the exchange rate depreciation accelerates from one to two percent per annum, but it will have a significant effect if introduced when the exchange rate depreciation accelerates from 10 to 11 percent (provided that the distribution of mark-ups has a mean of 12 percent and a standard deviation of 4 percent).
III. THE REST OF THE ECONOMY
The rest of the economy comprises micro businesses, banks, and the government sector, which all depend on the non-financial sector to various degrees. The micro businesses operate at the margin and thus follow development in the non-financial sector and banks are dependent on the non-financial sector via revenues. The government sector operates somewhat more independently from the non-financial sector.
The impact of changes in the non-financial sector on the rest of the economy is evaluated only roughly. The rest of the economy is likely less cyclical due to a lower leverage of micro businesses and banking and specifics of the government sector. Since the rest of the economy is not modeled explicitly, the impact on the rest of the economy from shocks to the non-financial sector is evaluated only roughly. Namely, by applying the relative procyclicality of the non-financial sector relative to the rest of the economy, as observed in 2008 and 2009, to simulations of new equilibrium in the non-financial sector.
IV. CALIBRATION AND SIMULATION FOR SERBIA
In late-2008, as the global financial crisis spilled over, the loan market in Serbia suddenly switched from an over-optimistic to over-pessimistic state. Until October 2008, the Serbian Dinar (RSD)/Euro exchange rate, in which more than 90 percent of bank credit was granted, remained stable. During the last quarter of 2008, it depreciated by 9 percent year-on-year and during 2009 it lost 15 percent year-on-year. In reaction, at the beginning of 2009, the government introduced credit subsidies as part of its economic program.
A. Credit Subsidy Schemes
In February 2009, the government announced a credit subsidy program, which aimed at easing the impact of the global financial crisis on Serbia. The programs aimed at stimulating both supply and demand sides of the economy with a focus on Serbian non-financial corporate sector. On the supply side, participating companies received interest rate subsidies on credit for liquidity, working assets, export deals, and investment projects, but beneficiary companies must not lay off employees. On the demand side, consumers were incentivized by subsidized from Podpiera and Rakova, 2008) . During 1974-86, Dutch manufacturing companies reported an average pricecost margin of 18 percent, which varied with a standard deviation of 2 percent (see Prince and Thurik, 1992) .
consumer loans for locally produced goods and mortgage loans. The key details of the schemes are summarized below.
Limited amounts of liquidity-type loans per company became available at a beneficially low interest rate with repayment schedule of 12 months. The interest rate credit subsidy amounted to five percentage points from a capped interest rate of 10.5 percent or flexible Euribor 1M plus eight percent p.a. on FX-denominated loans. In May, the cap was unified to eight percent on all FX-denominated loans (with the exception for reprogramming loans having a cap of 9.9 percent). RSD-denominated loans were introduced with the interest rate cap set at the level of the reference rate of the National Bank of Serbia (NBS) less 3.5 percentage points. The NBS allowed banks to reduce the base for calculating the Required Reserves (RR) for loans extended under the program, provided that banks do not deleverage. From the start of the program, ceilings were set, ranging from 20 thousand euro or 2 million dinars for entrepreneurs to 2 million euro or 200 million dinars for large companies, while the export loans ceilings were double. If a company used up the maximum amount for any of these two subcategories of liquidity loans it could no longer apply for new subsidized loans.
Limited amounts, per borrower, of subsidized three-year-repayment consumer loans and lump-sum subsidies were designed for purchasing durable consumer goods produced in Serbia. The program, subsequently extended to legal entities, covered purchases of cars, trucks, busses, tractors, construction machines, construction material, agricultural machines, furniture, white goods, software, computers, monitors, speakers, and tourist arrangements. Interest rates were fixed, i.e., 9.5 percent on cars and 11 percent on the rest of Serbian products. The interest rate subsidy was five percent. The repayment period was three years, with a one-year grace period. Buyers were further incentivized by: (1) rebate of one thousand euro trade-in cars used for purchasing locally produced new FIAT Punto cars; (2) subsidy in the amount of two thousand euro for purchasing locally produced tractors; and (3) subsidy in the amount of 20 percent for purchasing locally produced trucks with an additional 10 percent subsidy for the trade-in car as well as 20 percent subsidy for purchasing construction machines.
The objective of the subsidized housing loans (mortgages) was to boost the construction sector. Subsidized loans had a limit of euro 100 thousand. The program was limited to first-time home buyers, not older than 45 years.
B. Model Calibration
The model is calibrated for a rather homogenous group of Serbian small, medium, and large companies in 2008. Small, medium, and large companies share three features, which make them a rather homogenous production entity (Table 1) . First, even though the size of companies differs, the physical output per worker in each company is roughly equal across companies. Second, the gross markup (gross value added over turnover) does not vary substantially across the three size-categories of companies. And third, during a downturn, the exit of companies took place rather uniformly across differently sized companies. (Table 1) . Therefore, a linear production function with a single production factor-labor-and a labor productivity parameter, A = 0.57, well approximates the physical output produced by every company in the Serbian non-financial sector. Companies operate in the condition of an imperfect competition with similar markups. They produce close substitute goods and charge similar markups (see gross markups in Table 1 ). Therefore, the market structure can be approximated by an imperfect competition with equal markups across companies, which is derived from a constant elasticity of substitution between products (ɵ = 2.28). Such calibration implies the gross markup of 22 percent, which corresponds to the actual average of 21.5 percent in 2008.
There is a similar portion of overleveraged companies in each size-category of companies. This can be indirectly inferred from the proportion of exiting companies during the downturn in 2009. Although large companies charge on average slightly higher markups than the other sizegroups, the proportion of closed large companies in large companies during the 2009 downturn is very comparable to similar proportions for the other two size-groups of companies. This observation indicates that all size-categories of companies have a similar distribution of companies according to leverage.
The leverage is distributed normally across all companies. The distribution is modeled as continuous rather than discrete, 9 since the exact shape is unknown and a sample of random drawings would not be stationary due to the relatively small number of companies. The mean and standard deviation (49.5 and 27 percent, respectively) are calibrated from the available data (see Table 1 ).
The threshold for receiving credit is based on loan rejection rates in the region. Based on a survey from 2004 and 05, Brown et al. (2011) report loan rejection rates in Europe. The rate in Eastern Europe is 7.6 percent (an average of the rates for discouraged and non-discouraged applicants). It follows that companies need free cash flows in the amount exceeding 38 percent of the value added to qualify for bank credit. This threshold for free cash flows was assumed unchanged also for 2009; according to reporting banks, credit standards remained in 2009 rather unchanged.
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The distribution of free cash flows is derived using equation (6) and the calibrated distribution of leverage.
Number of all companies (potential and actual) follows from the rejection rate and the actual number of companies in 2008. The number of actual and potential companies is derived by dividing the actual number of companies in 2008 by the credit approval rate. If banks had granted loans to all companies that apply, there would have been 14,686 companies in 2008. 9 A particular choice of a discrete distribution is important for the effect of the credit subsidy. In order to calibrate an average benchmark effect we use the continuous approximation.
The sector exhibits large, unhedged, and primarily euro denominated borrowings. Based on NBS statistics of bank claims on corporate sector, 75 percent of loans to the corporate sector were FX loans. We assume that all FX loans were unhedged against the FX risk. The use of hedging was very limited mainly due to illegality of hedging FX-indexed RSD loans, which dominated the corporate lending. In 2009, RSD depreciated year-on-year against euro from 81.3 to 93.1, i.e., 14.5 percent.
Reported interest rates declined in 2009, but the cost of servicing FX borrowing increased due to RSD depreciation. The average borrowing costs of the corporate sector have been constructed by the NBS from statistics on total fresh lending from the NBS, the set of measures aimed for mitigating negative effects of the global economic crisis from the Ministry of the Economy and Regional Development, and on housing loans from National Mortgage Insurance Corporation. The data on total banking exposure to the non-financial sector were also used. The weighted average interest rate (on RSD and FX) on the stock of loans to non-financial sector amounted to 14. Table 2 .
The models' simulation for 2009 reveals sector's adjustments due to changes in the exchange rate, interest rate, and sector's demand. Compared to 2008 Compared to , in 2009 , the RSD depreciated against euro by approximately 15 percent and the customer lending interest rate decreased by nearly two and half percentage points (see Table 1 ). The sector's nominal demand increased by 1.6 percent mainly due to consumer credit subsidy schemes. These are the only three changes that have been used to simulate the model's 2009 equilibrium. The equilibrium again closely matches the actual 2009 data (see Table 2 , columns Model and Data for 2009).
The 2009 shocks caused banks to close several companies; operating companies reprised the cost of borrowing to clients; and the physical output declined. In year-on-year perspective, the share of companies that did not get credit increased from seven to 12 percent. Operating companies raised prices by seven percent and benefited from lower wage costs due to a decreasing sector's employment (the price cost margin increased to 57 percent). Declining employment was mostly due to laying off employees from closing companies
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. As a result, the sector's physical output declined by five percent.
D. Subsidy Scheme Simulations
The calibrated model, which has been shown to reasonably accurately simulate the change from equilibrium in 2008 to the one in 2009 in the previous subsection, is used for policy simulations. There are three model simulations: (1) without interest rate subsidy for companies, (2) without any subsidies, and (3) with government spending in the amount of actual costs of subsidies (spending is directed to the non-financial sector). The results are summarized in Table 3 . These simulations yield the impact for the non-financial sector of the economy. For the impact on the overall economy, we need to derive the real growth in the rest of the economy, which is done using a simple approximation, described in Section III.
First, if the interest rate subsidies for companies has not been introduced, the country's real output would have declined by 4.2 percent. The absence of interest rate subsidies for companies would imply closing down additional one percent of companies, declining wage and physical output, and rising inflation. The subsidy programs reduced effective borrowing costs by about one percentage point (see Table 1 ) and thus a new equilibrium is simulated with a higher cost of credit by 0.9 percentage points. As reported in Table 3 , in this situation, additional one percent of companies would not qualify for credit and would be closed. The average number of employees and the physical output per employee would not change, compared to the simulation with subsidies, but the number of employees and the wage in the non-financial sector would both decline by 0.6 percent. Inflation would accelerate by 0.7 percentage points and the sector's physical output would additionally decline by one percentage point. The non-financial sector' contribution to the decline in Serbian real output would increase by 0.4 percent to 2.3 percent. Using the approximate spillover from this sector to the rest of the economy (see Table 3 , and Sections III and IV. B), the rest of the economy would contribute to the fall in output by 1.9 percent. , accounting for 10 percent of newly granted loans. Assuming the efficiency of 25 percent for such programs 13 , the sector's demand was reduced by 2.5 percent as an initial shock (25 percent from approximately RSD 100 billion) for simulating the equilibrium without credit subsidy schemes. The model's equilibrium, simulated under no credit subsidy, showed a further deepening recession, a decline in inflation, employment, and wage. Compared to the simulation without interest rate subsidies for companies, the negative shock into the demand led to a decline in the nominal demand by four percent with sector's physical output (as well as employment and wage) falling by additional two percent and inflation by 2.2 percentage points (see Table 3 ). Adding the spillover from non-financial sector to the rest of the economy, it follows that the economy would experience in 2009 a deeper recession (by 2.1 percent) than actually observed.
And third, if the fiscal stimulus would have been used directly for purchases of goods by the government, the economic recession would have been slightly milder compared to the case without any subsidies. The last column in Table 3 represents a simulated equilibrium, in which the government spends the amount of money, which it paid for the subsidy programs directly for purchases of goods from the non-financial sector. This shows the effectiveness of the credit subsidy schemes relative to a benchmark of a simple government spending. Compared to the no-subsidy case, the output of the sector declines less, by 0.6 percentage points, inflation speeds up by 0.6 percentage points and both the monthly wage and employment increase by 0.6 percentage points. In this policy simulation, the physical output of the entire economy would fall by 5.2 percent, which is only by 0.4 percentage points less than in the case of no subsidies. It seems that the credit subsidies reach a higher effectiveness than simple government spending.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Serbia introduced credit subsidy programs during the current financial crisis as a countercyclical policy measure. In late 2008, the economic climate in Serbia significantly worsened and in February 2009, the government announced a credit subsidy program. The programs aimed at stimulating both supply and demand of the economy with a focus on the Serbian non-financial corporate sector. On the supply side, participating companies received interest rate subsidies on credit for liquidity, working assets, export deals, and investment projects, but beneficiary companies were not allowed to lay off employees. On the demand side, consumers were incentivized by subsidized consumer loans for locally produced goods and mortgage loans.
The subsidy schemes had a countercyclical effect, reducing the 2009 recession by estimated 1-2 percentage points but it is too early to assess whether it was socially optimal. Based on the perfomed simulations, the real GDP of the entire economy would have fallen by 5.6 percent instead of the observed 3.5 percent, have not been subsidy schemes implemented. The non-financial sector would contribute to economy's recession by an additional 1.2 percentage points, while the rest of the economy would add 0.9 percentage points. Nearly 150 additional companies would have been closed and the employment rate in the non-financial sector would have fallen by additional 2.7 percent. Besides growth, subsidies set on several non-trivial itertemporal and distributional effects, which are yet to be realized and assessed from a social optimum point of view.
Serbian-specific circumstances increased the effectiveness of subsidy schemes, which was much higher than a direct spending by the government. The Serbian government had incidently available resources and shaped the subsidy schemes several times in response to the developments; but the success in promoting subsidized lending was facilitated by the high competition in the banking sector and ample banks liquidity. The credit subsidy schemes increased the aggregate demand much more than a direct government spending would have done and the credit subsidy for companies reduced the loan rejection rate by one percent. Thus, a less depleted corporate sector made the country better positioned for an economic upturn.
